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

Slavery & Abolition
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713719071

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Online Publication Date: 01 April 1997

To cite this Article Morgan, Philip D.(1997)'The cultural implications of the Atlantic slave trade: African regional origins, American destinations and new world developments',Slavery & Abolition,18:1,122 — 145

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01440399708575206

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01440399708575206

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The Cultural Implications of the Atlantic Slave Trade: African Regional Origins, American Destinations and New World Developments

PHILIP D. MORGAN

In the early modern era, an increasingly integrated and cohesive Atlantic world began to emerge. The Atlantic was the first ocean in the history of the world to be regularly crossed, and the lands that bordered it came to have a common history. Over time, a variety of links, bonds and connections drew the territories around the Atlantic – that vast 'inland sea' – more closely together. People, goods and ideas circulated in ever wider and deeper flows between the pan-Atlantic continents. Changes in one corner of the Atlantic world had repercussions in others; even seemingly local and provincial developments invariably had Atlantic dimensions. Diverse and heterogeneous, this Atlantic world became one – a unitary whole, a single system.[1]

Slavery was a central feature of this emergent Atlantic system. It was the cornerstone of a vast Atlantic labour market which, though inelastic and inefficient, nevertheless functioned as one. Of course, the institution of slavery varied enormously from one locale to another, but it was no curious abnormality, no aberration, no marginal feature of this world. Few Atlantic peoples before the late eighteenth century found servile labour embarrassing or evil; rather, slavery was fundamental and acceptable, bearing an ancient pedigree to be sure, but readily adaptable to a variety of needs and circumstances. Prior to 1820 two to three times as many Africans as Europeans crossed the Atlantic to the New World. Much of the wealth of the Atlantic economy derived from slave-produced commodities in what was the world's first system of multinational production for a mass market. Slavery defined the structure of many Atlantic societies, underpinning not just their economies but their social, political, cultural and ideological systems. If slavery then must be situated squarely at the centre of the

Atlantic world, it also must be considered as a single sphere of inquiry, encompassing Europe, Africa and the Americas. Slavery must be viewed in its full Atlantic context.[2]

At the heart of Atlantic slavery was the slave trade, a vast co-ordinated system for the forced migration of Africans often from hundreds of miles in their homeland interiors to virtually every corner of the Americas. Both Europeans and Africans participated in the trade, and four continents were deeply influenced by it. The best studies of the trade, beginning with Philip D. Curtin's seminal *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, have sought to explore 'whole institutions and whole processes, seen in the large and separate from the mere national subdivisions'. Since, as Curtin put it, 'the institutions of the slave trade were common to the Atlantic community', an Atlantic perspective is the only way to understand fully what was the largest inter-continental migration then known to the world. Curtin's book is still the best place to start for an understanding of the Atlantic slave trade. Indeed, in many ways, it has still not been superseded.[3]

The book that perhaps has done most to build on Curtin's insights is John Thornton's lavishly praised *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World*. Thornton describes his work as an attempt to assess the 'migration of Africans to the Americas and to place this assessment in the growing field of Atlantic history'. He argues, among other things, that randomization was not a function of the middle passage; rather, slave ships drew their entire cargo from only one or two African ports, and their catchment areas were homogeneous. Thus, 'an entire ship might be filled, not just with people possessing the same culture, but with people who grew up together'. Once in the Americas, most slaves 'on any sizeable estate were probably from only a few national groupings'. Therefore, Thornton continues, 'most slaves would have no shortage of people from their own nation with whom to communicate'. In Thornton's view, particular African national groups tended to dominate particular slave societies in the Americas; Africans in the New World often shared common languages and cultures that helped them survive in a hostile setting. In most parts of the Americas, it is now contended, slaves perceived themselves as part of communities that had distinct ethnic or national roots.[4]

Thornton's book ostensibly ends in 1680, but he and others are willing to argue that ethnicity or nationality was central to slave life beyond the seventeenth century. In a general text designed by Thornton and others for the college student and informed reader, the concept of nation as an ethno-linguistic entity serves as the key social force driving the development of slave life well beyond 1680. One or two African nations in most New World settings, it is argued, dominated most slave societies. Gwendolyn Hall credits transplanted Bambara as the central players in Afro-American

culture in Louisiana. 'The Louisiana experience,' she observes, 'calls into question the common assumption that African slaves could not regroup themselves in language and social communities derived from the sending cultures.' Mervyn Alleyne believes that 'one African ethnic group (the Twi) provided political and cultural leadership' among Jamaican slaves; he also thinks that 'entire functioning languages' and 'entire religions', not just general cultural orientations or religious beliefs, were carried to Jamaica. Michael Mullin has argued that 'ethnicity', which he sees as a euphemism for tribalism, was particularly important among Anglo-American slaves, especially in the West Indies. Thus, for Mullin, Coromantee was 'the most conspicuous and important nationality in Anglo-America'. In short, an orthodoxy seems to have emerged that sees slaves as forming identifiable communities based on their ethnic or national pasts.[5]

This essay will explore this emerging paradigm in two ways. First, it will examine evidence from the latest and most comprehensive analyses of the Atlantic slave trade, especially in so far as these bear on the question of African ethnicity and nationality. Second, it will explore three key issues raised by the slave trade material and Thornton's (and others') arguments. Throughout, this study will aim for the widest angle of vision, the broadest transoceanic framework, seeking to see the Atlantic as a single, complex unit of analysis, and trying to break out of the national boundaries traditionally set for the study of slavery, whether African or American.

Exciting new material is beginning to emerge from an extraordinarily important project sponsored by the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for Afro-American Research at Harvard University. With David Eltis, David Richardson and Stephen D. Behrendt at the helm, this project is compiling information on all known individual voyages drawn from the records of all the major European and American slaving powers. To date, records exist on almost 27,000 voyages, extending from the late sixteenth to the late nineteenth centuries. When complete, the project will have information on well over half of all the ships that made a transatlantic slave voyage. This project has already compiled the largest data set for the study of the long-distance movement of peoples before the twentieth century. As a result of this project, and the work on which it builds, we now know more about the forced migration of Africans than the voluntary migration of Europeans in the early modern era.[6]

The brief of this study is limited: to think about the cultural implications of the project's preliminary findings. Clearly, these thoughts are provisional, because the analyses are available in largely aggregate terms. More refined analyses of smaller temporal and spatial units will add much to the general picture and lead to much more sophisticated conclusions than are presently possible. As much as this author recognizes the necessity of Atlantic history,

his expertise is confined to the British–American world, followed by some passing acquaintance with the French and Dutch sectors, an even less nodding awareness of the Iberian zones, and least understanding of the African dimensions of the story.

As David Eltis and David Richardson have argued, the key findings of their consolidated and comprehensive set of data concern neither Africa nor the Americas treated alone, but rather the connections between the continents. In short, Eltis and Richardson and Behrendt are engaged in true Atlantic history. They are able to view the intercontinental flow of people from both sending and receiving poles. From the vantage point of Africa, it is now possible to look outward from each coastal region and trace where the forced migrants went. Most African regions funnelled a majority of their forced emigrants to one region in the Americas. Thus, three-quarters of those leaving South-East Africa went to South-Central Brazil; two of three Africans from the Bight of Biafra left for the British Caribbean; 60 per cent of the Bight of Benin's emigrants went to Bahia; a half of those leaving Senegambia went to the French Caribbean; a half of West-Central Africa's emigrants went to South Brazil; and a half of the Gold Coast's and Windward Coast's emigrants went to the British Caribbean. To be sure, all the regions of Africa sent slaves to almost all the regions of the Americas, but people tended to flow in one dominant channel. In some cases, there was a subsidiary stream: thus a quarter of the Gold Coast's slaves went to Surinam and the Guyanas; a quarter of the Windward Coast's slaves went to St. Domingue; and a fifth of West-Central Africa's slaves went to the French Caribbean. Nevertheless, the regional African perspective on slave destinations reveals a distinct geographic concentration, or in a few cases two concentrations, in where the slaves went.

Equally striking patterns emerge when the transatlantic links are examined from the more usual perspective of the American regions of disembarkation. What stands out – and these observations are only a variation on the emphases of Eltis and Richardson – are two extremes. First, the two main regions of Brazil – Bahia and the South-Central area – drew heavily on a single region of Africa. In Bahia's case about nine in ten Africans came from the Bight of Benin; in South-Central Brazil about eight in ten came from West-Central Africa. Second, at the other extreme, true for much of the Caribbean and North America, is the absence of a dominant single African provenance zone. No region of Africa, for example, supplied more than about 30 per cent of arrivals to either Cuba, Barbados, Martinique, Guadeloupe, or the Danish islands. Between the two extremes were some major destinations that received about half of their arrivals from a particular African coastal region: St. Domingue from West-Central Africa, the British Leeward Islands from the Bight of Biafra, and the Guyanas and

Surinam from the Gold Coast. In each of these American destinations – from St. Domingue to Surinam – the other half of their African influx came from a number of regions. Brazil, then, was exceptional in drawing slaves heavily from one region, while most other parts of the Americas drew on a wider mix of African peoples, even if in some cases about half of slaves came from one region.[7]

These broad summaries of aggregate patterns disguise marked shifts over time. David Eltis has provided a detailed chronological analysis of the British trade before 1714. A close, decade-by-decade examination of this trade reveals that the leading African provenance zones that supplied Africans to Barbados and Jamaica were constantly changing. In the 1660s the Bight of Biafra was the leading supplier; in the 1670s the Gold Coast, Bight of Benin and Bight of Biafra were roughly equal providers; in the 1680s the Bight of Benin was the leader; in the 1690s again the Bight of Benin dominated the trade, but with strong infusions from West-Central Africa into Jamaica and from the Gold Coast into Barbados; in the 1700s and early 1710s, the Bight of Benin and increasingly the Gold Coast were pre-eminent. David Richardson has explored the aggregate eighteenth-century British trade. He reveals, for example, that from the 1710s through 1730s British shipments of slaves from Senegambia reached an all-time high; during the 1760s and 1770s about a third of British Africans came from the Windward Coast; and from the 1780s through 1807, the Bight of Biafra and West-Central Africa accounted for about 70 per cent of British slave exports. A dynamic, diasporic approach indicates how slaves came from a changing series of African coastal regions. The aggregate picture masks a fluid, evanescent reality.[8]

The age and sex structure of a migration, just as much as its size and regional origin, also had a differential impact on both sending and receiving societies. While long-distance migrations are typically dominated by young men, variations occurred. One significant finding is that the slave migration, stereotypically portrayed as heavily male, was not in fact so, when put in its full Atlantic context. Compared to the trade in indentured servants, the slave trade comprised a remarkably large number of women and children. As Eltis and Engerman note, 'a higher proportion of children left Africa than left Europe'. Indeed, overall, women and children outnumbered men in the slave trade. The sex and age ratios of the Atlantic slave trade were most comparable to free, not contractual, migrant flows.

Furthermore, the proportion of women varied quite markedly, both between African regions of embarkation and American regions of arrival and over time. Looked at from the perspective of African regions, the ratio of male to female slaves varied from about 75:25 in upper Guinea to about 55:45 at the Bight of Biafra. From the perspective of American regions,

much larger shares of women were carried to the British areas than elsewhere, with women and men arriving in almost equal numbers in early Barbados and Jamaica, whereas between two and three times more men than women arrived in Cuba and in Brazil. Over time, the share of women among African arrivals fell uniformly across African regions. From one region to the next, the proportion of women dropped by well over 50 per cent from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. After 1810 women constituted a quite small proportion of Africans from every coastal region.

Lastly, the proportion of children also fluctuated widely. West-Central Africa, and to a lesser extent Upper Guinea and the Bight of Benin exported greater shares of children than other African regions. Even more dramatically, the proportion of children entering the transatlantic trade more than tripled from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. After 1810 over a half of those leaving South-East Africa and West-Central Africa, and just under a half of those from Upper Guinea, were children. The rise in the number of children carried in the Atlantic slave trade occurred in all regions, but was most pronounced at the most northerly and southerly extremes of the African coast. From the perspective of receiving regions, South-Central Brazil imported the most children, accounting for a half of all African arrivals; Cuba received 38 per cent, Bahia 35 per cent, and the French Caribbean and North America about 25 per cent. At the other extreme, only about 10 per cent of the slaves who arrived in the British Caribbean were children.[9]

Aggregate, sequential and structural analyses therefore emphasize the complexity of the slave trade. As a way of summarizing their data, Eltis and Richardson single out the regional composition of an African migration, its duration, and its demographic character, which leads them to posit their own dual pattern. Cuba represents one extreme. Its newcomers were drawn from a wide array of African coastal regions; its African influx was fairly short-lived, lasting about eighty years (from 1790 to 1867); and the African arrivals comprised many children and few women. For all these reasons – the relative absence of a shared background, the short span of the slave-trading connection, and the youthful and predominantly male character of its immigrants, which militated against family life and the transmission of culture – the 'Cuhan African population had the potential for the greatest loss of culture and language specific to particular African regions'. At the other extreme, Eltis and Richardson argue, was the British Caribbean, where most immigrants came from just two coastal regions (three out of five newcomers came from the Bight of Biafra and the Gold Coast), where African immigration lasted about twice as long as Cuba's, and where women were twice as numerous as Cuba's arrivals. Eltis and Richardson therefore conclude that 'the opportunities for family formation and the

perpetuation of language and culture were likely stronger [in Barbados specifically, and the British Caribbean more generally] than anywhere else in the Americas'.[10]

In several ways the preliminary findings of the Atlantic slave trade project seem to lend support to the emerging paradigm propounded by Thornton and others. Eltis and Richardson emphasize that 'the distribution of Africans in the New World was no more randomized than was its European counterpart'. With the exception of Bahia and Minas Gerais, they conclude that 'the African part in the re-peopling of South and Central America was as dominated by West-Central Africa, as was its European counterpart by Iberians'. In the Caribbean, they continue, 'West Africa was as dominant as was West-Central Africa in South America'. Even where the mixture of African peoples was greatest, African regions tended to supply slaves in sequence, therefore minimizing the mixture at any one time. In short, they conclude, 'the picture of a confusing mix of African cultures with all the attendant barriers to establishing African carryovers to the New World needs revising'. Revisionism then is widespread. My question is simple: is it justified? Was the slave trade markedly less random than we once thought?[11]

To answer these questions, three central issues must be explored. First, how homogenous or heterogenous was the Atlantic slave trade seen from the vantage points of African coastal regions and American destinations? Second, is it best to focus attention on ports, seeing Atlantic slaving vessels largely visiting one or at most two African ports and then delivering their forced migrants to one American port? Finally, and most importantly, what do we mean by ethnic and national identity in the early modern era and what implications has this for New World cultural development? These questions will be addressed from an Atlantic perspective, thinking not just of Africa or America separately; but rather viewing them as linked or interconnected continents. The Atlantic was a bridge as well as a barrier; the lands ringing this ocean were joined as well as sundered by the sea.

The Europeans on the African coast were engaged in a highly competitive trade. To be sure, certain parts of the coast tended to be dominated by one power, as Eltis and Richardson and others have pointed out. In the eighteenth century the British dominated slave exports from the Bight of Biafra; the French held the upper hand in trade with Senegambia; and the Portuguese controlled shipments from most of the region south of Zaire. But domination was never absolute and was always under challenge. Thus, although the Portuguese based in Brazil certainly dominated trade with the Bight of Benin – just over half of all slave voyages that arrived in Benin set out from Bahia – yet French ships accounted for a fifth of all slavers, and the Dutch, English and later Spanish were at various times

significant players on the 'Slave Coast'. As much as one might say that Bahia dominated the Bight of Benin trade, nevertheless almost a half of the slavers arriving there were non-Bahian. Furthermore European slavers always encountered shifting fortunes along the coast. In the early eighteenth century the British acquired about a sixth of their Africans from Senegambia but by the 1750s less than half that proportion; in the 1720s the Dutch West India Company dramatically turned from the Bight of Benin to the Gold Coast for its main source of slaves, and, with the era of free trade, the Dutch again shifted their centre of gravity westward to the Windward Coast; as the Dutch moved westward, the French moved eastward, and by the middle of the eighteenth century they had relocated their slave-trading energies from the Bight of Benin to Central Africa.[12]

Even within a single African coastal region, marked shifts often occurred in the peoples forcibly expelled. The complex competition for trade was as much among Africans as among Europeans. The supply of slaves to the Bight of Benin, for example, changed drastically from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Down to the late eighteenth century, when the Oyo were a principal supplier of slaves to the Slave Coast, peoples from the north and west of Oyo – Nupe, Borgu, Hausa, and various Ewe-speaking peoples – were readily available. In the nineteenth century, after the collapse of the Oyo empire, Yoruba-speaking peoples dominated the flow leaving Bight of Benin ports, while the emergence of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Central Sudan generated a growing secondary stream of Hausa slaves. By the early nineteenth century 'there were at least two demographically distinct components of the trade at the Bight of Benin', notes Paul Lovejoy, 'one that brought males from the distant interior to the coast and another that siphoned off slaves (men, women and children) from the coast itself'. Thus it is somewhat misleading to say that Bahia received virtually all its slaves from the Bight of Benin, if by this is meant to imply some uniformity over time. The ethnicity of those leaving the Slave Coast and arriving in Bahia changed drastically over time.[13]

The relationship of coastal ports to hinterlands grew more complicated over time, which again enhanced the increasing diversity of peoples shipped across the Atlantic. Over time, for example, the region known as West-Central Africa came to cover a wider range of coastline and drew on an increasingly expanding hinterland, extending hundreds of kilometres from the coast. At least three, sometimes four, distinct commercial networks drew slaves from the interior toward the Atlantic shores. The mix of peoples flowing from that region grew more, not less, heterogeneous. Different ports within a single coastal region might draw upon different and fluctuating streams of peoples. Thus, along the early nineteenth-century Bight of Biafra coast, Igbo-speakers dominated slaves shipped from Bonny,

Ibibio-speakers comprised 40 per cent of slaves shipped from Old Calabar, and slaves from much further inland – Nupe, Kakanda, and Hausa, for example – formed between 5 and 25 per cent of the exported slaves from various Biafran ports.[14]

If the lens focuses primarily on the American side of the Atlantic, the emphasis again ought to be on heterogeneity. This is so because, as Eltis and Richardson have noted, the 'geographic concentration of arrivals in the Americas is much less than that of African departures'. Even if attention is directed to the places that received most Africans – a band stretching from about Cuba in the north to Central Brazil in the south – such American destinations encompass a much wider span of landscapes, climates, and environments than the coastline of West and West-Central Africa. If attention broadens to all the places in the Americas that received Africans – from New York in the north to Buenos Aires in the south – then the geographical diversity is staggering. New World slavery knew no limits; it penetrated every economic activity, every type of settlement, every setting. American slaves lived in temperate highlands as well as in tropical lowlands, on large continental plains and on small mountainous islands, on farms as well as on plantations, in cities as well as in the countryside; they worked in fields and in shops, in manual and skilled occupations, in civilian and in military life, up trees and down mines, on land and at sea.[15]

Even when the lens zooms to a single region or city, such as Rio de Janeiro centred in South-Central Brazil, which, as noted, drew heavily on West-Central Africa for its slaves, heterogeneity still seems the most accurate description of its African residents. This may seem a ridiculous proposition, for on the face of it Rio seems the perfect place to find homogeneity. At least two-thirds of Africans living in nineteenth-century Rio traced their homelands to West-Central Africa. As Mary Karasch puts it, the 'Central Africanness' of the city's slaves is fundamental to an understanding of their culture. Yet Karasch stresses Rio's 'extraordinary ethnic diversity'. Slaves from West-Central Africa were from three distinct sub-regions. The first, Congo North, supplied 'thousands of ethnic groups' to Rio, and in certain decades – the 1830s and 1840s, in particular – the ethnic mix from Cabinda, the central port of Congo North, was especially notable. Second, although slaves from Angola came from a more restricted area than the Congos, they still comprised numerous ethnic groups and at least two major linguistic groups: the Kimbundu-speaking populations of Luanda and its hinterland; and the Lunda-Tchokwe of eastern Angola. Finally, the third important port and sub-region was Benguela in southern Angola, whence came Ovimbundu and Ngangela peoples among others. So, the West-Central origins of most Rio slaves was in fact a congeries of peoples, languages and cultures. Further, important as Central Africa was to

Rio's slaves, as many as a fifth to a quarter of the city's Africans could trace their heritage to East Africa. The so-called Mocambique nation became one of the largest in the city. Finally, although West Africa was the least important source of Rio's slaves, so-called Minas and Calabars were prominent in the city. Rio, then, was truly a babel of African peoples.[16]

Just as the new paradigm tightly links one African region to a single American society, so the new orthodoxy sees slave ships connecting one African port to a single American destination. In some ways, this is a valuable perspective. One of the most exciting features of the Du Bois Institute project is its capacity to follow a ship (and perhaps, in the future, individuals) from a port in Africa to a port in the Americas. Preliminary analysis from the project reveals the importance of a small number of African ports. Two-thirds of African slaves shipped from known points, rather than from broad coastal regions, left from just twenty ports. Ranking the ports that shipped the most slaves, three of the top five – Cabinda, Benguela and Luanda – were in West-Central Africa. About two-thirds of departures from the Bight of Benin were from Whydah. Indeed, as Eltis and Richardson note, 'probably well over one million slaves left from Whydah, making it the single most important oceanic outlet for slaves in sub-Saharan Africa'. Similarly, almost 80 per cent of all slaves in the Bight of Biafra region left from just two outlets, Bonny and Calabar. The concentration of African departures from just a few sites is notable.[17]

Nevertheless, some caution is in order. One cannot accept uncritically the stated African destinations of ships clearing European ports. Further, ships designated as having boarded their slaves at a particular port did not always obtain all their slaves even from the coastal region of that port. The African point of embarkation may have been simply the last port of call. In 1744 a Dutchman at Elmina on the Gold Coast reported that most of his countrymen purchased their slaves on the Windward Coast, sailing on to Elmina only when their slave cargo was still deficient. From detailed records of over fifty free-trade Dutch ships from the 1740s through the 1780s, about three-quarters of all slaves were acquired before the ship reached the Gold Coast. Even on the Gold Coast itself, the Dutch drew fairly diversely. Elmina was their major port of call, but slaves from various Dutch trading stations were often taken by small boats to Elmina. One statistical record from the mid-1720s to mid-1750s indicates that Elmina provided only one-third of the Gold Coast slaves; ports from Axim in the west to Accra in the east supplied the other two-thirds. Similarly, in the sub-region of West-Central Africa known as Congo North, slave traders sometimes picked up slaves along the entire coast even if they then called them Cabindas after the central port of the region.[18]

These cautionary notes should not be exaggerated. It was unusual for a

ship to purchase slaves in more than one coastal region. The major exceptions were ships that bought in the Gold Coast and Bight of Benin chiefly before 1720, and ships that touched at various points of the Windward Coast on their way to the Gold and Slave Coasts. Probably no more than a fifth of the Gold Coast ships went on to the Bight of Benin, even before 1720; and Gold and Slave Coast ships normally (with perhaps the exception of the Dutch) bought only a few slaves before reaching their major markets. Coastal trading was common, so slaves would come from a range of fairly proximate places rather than from a single port. Nevertheless, there were exceptions. For example, Whydah seemed to be able to supply all its prospective purchasers, without ships having to trade elsewhere, and the same appears to have been the case at various ports on the Gambia.[19]

In another sense, however, whether a ship landed at one or two or more African ports is somewhat beside the point; rather, the real issue is the complexity of networks deep within Africa that funnelled slaves into nodal points on the coast. Joseph Miller has written a brilliant study of just such networks for West-Central Africa. As he points out, the whole region consisted of over 1,000 kilometres of coastline and a slaving hinterland that by the early nineteenth century extended 2,500 kilometres inland. Overall, slaves were drawn from locales within a region of 2.5 million square kilometres, an area larger than the United States east of the Mississippi River. In most of the central market places in the interior of West-Central Africa, traders dispatched slaves in sizeable caravans that marched at best 150 kilometres a month. As the moving frontier zone of slaving violence advanced eastwards, a complex fan of trade routes, ever more extensive and convoluted, radiated out into the interior. The sequence of multiple sales that attended transfers of slaves between their place of seizure and the coast could divert the flow in almost any direction. As slaves plodded westward, many died and others were added, so that by the time they reached the coast the caravans were indeed a motley crew. The process was, in Miller's words, an 'agonizing progress toward the coast that lasted months if not years'. The actual port of embarkation was therefore just one link in a highly complex chain. No other slaving hinterland was large as West-Central Africa's, but then again no other coastal region supplied as many slaves to New World.[20]

The Du Bois Institute project is able to rank not just African ports of embarkation but American ports of disembarkation; once again, the concentration is notable. Eltis and Richardson rank the top seventeen American ports, descending to St. George's in Grenada, the lowest ranked on their list with a known importation of less than 50,000 slaves. The top two ports are Brazilian – Rio de Janeiro on Guanabara Bay which received over 800,000 slaves, and Bahia (presumably primarily Salvador) which

received almost 700,000. Directly below these two are many Caribbean ports, the most important of which in descending rank order are Cap Francais in St. Domingue with 350,000 known arrivals, Bridgetown in Barbados with 340,000, Havana in Cuba with 210,000, and Kingston in Jamaica with 190,000.[21]

Most slave ships probably had a single destination, but whether most slaves were sold and remained in the vicinity of their point of disembarkation seems somewhat more problematic. The whole question of Africans' subsequent movements within the Americas is complicated. Much more is known about the first place of landing than the Africans' final destinations. Just as the African port of embarkation is easier to document than the complex chain that led from interior to coast, so it is infinitely easier to record slaves landing at an American port than it is to trace their later movements.

At certain times, a lively re-export trade in slaves unquestionably arose in various American ports. The British sometimes landed slaves in their Caribbean islands before taking them to the North American mainland. After 1763, slaves were commonly re-exported from most British islands in the eastern Caribbean. Equally well known is that Jamaica was a major re-exporter of slaves. Over the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Jamaica imported over 800,000 Africans and transshipped about 200,000. A British slave trade of sorts persisted for a quarter of a century after abolition when over 20,000 thousand slaves were shipped from the older islands to the newer colonies, especially Trinidad and Demerara. Smaller European slave-trading nations engaged in much re-exporting. Many slaves imported by the Danes were transshipped. The Dutch were well known for landing slaves at islands like Curaçao and afterwards reshipping them to the Spanish–American mainland ports. Some slaves were transshipped from Curaçao to other Dutch colonies in the Caribbean or Guiana. War or market conditions sometimes forced a ship to alter its course and make more than one landing. With the growth of the Dutch free trade, Johannes Postma notes, the restless search for the most profitable markets often led to more than one landing. Before the direct trade to Cuba developed in the nineteenth century, Cuban and other Spanish Caribbean planters regularly purchased slaves in the well-established markets of Jamaica and Dominica. A robust inter-island and island-mainland trade existed in slaves as in much else.[22]

But the forced migration of Africans in the Americas was not just confined to transshipment; far more consequential were the long marches on American soil, sometimes in stages, far into the interior. In many ways, then, America may be conceived as a mirror image of Africa: ports on either side of the Atlantic were funnels for large slaving hinterlands that fanned

out across the land. As Miller points out, 'Even the ships headed to a single Brazilian captaincy must, finally, be understood as moving through no more than an intermediate stage in a complex redistribution to further destinations.' Rio received more slaves than any other New World port because it supplied Minas Gerais, was a route of access to São Paulo, and constituted a smuggling station on the way to the estuary of the Plate. Salvador was the second ranked largest port for slaves because many of those Africans continued south to Minas Gerais and north to Pernambuco and the Amazon. Slaves who had already been transshipped from various Caribbean islands to Cartagena and Portobello then faced further journeys to Colombia or Peru. Slaves landed in the Rio de la Plata went overland to Tucuman and then onto the silver mines at Potosi. Africans who arrived in Virginia after the early eighteenth century or South Carolina after the late eighteenth century were usually destined for the piedmont or even further inland. The American trek from port to places of residence was often as long and agonizing as the African march from point of capture to the coast.[23]

Movement both within Africa and the Americas complicates not just the notion of port to port correspondences but also the conception of homogenous peoples being swept up on one side of the ocean and set down *en masse* on the other. Because many African slaves came in tortuous and convoluted ways from the interior to the coast, whatever ethnic identity they originally had was undoubtedly in flux. Furthermore, it is often impossible from a late twentieth-century vantage point to reconstruct what, if anything, that ethnic identity might have been. Miller's description of the functioning of the Angolan slave trade – 'individuals being kidnapped, sold, resold, and captured again in the course of repeatedly disrupted lifetimes' – leads him to conclude that their so-called ethnic origins probably meant 'very little'. In addition, when Philip Curtin assembled a number of different samples of contemporaneous opinion on the ethnic distribution of the eighteenth-century Senegambian slave trade, what is most impressive is that three-quarters of the exported slaves occupy the 'non-ethnic' category. Only about 17 per cent of the slave exports from Senegambia were Wolof, 5 per cent Fulbé, and 3 per cent Sereer. Most slaves seem to have come from east of the heads of navigation – by way of Gajaaga and the Gambia – and cannot be assigned to a specific ethnic group.[24]

Even more fundamental, how aware were people of belonging to an imputed ethnic and cultural tradition? Whether the search is for a pan-African culture, broad regional cultures – as in Thornton's tripartite division of West and Central Africa into something akin to Caesar's Gaul – or more localized ethnic cultures, the same problem inheres: are we not in danger of adopting the hermeneutics of the observer? Do we not fall into the trap of denying the social and cultural worlds created by local actors, of

seeing similarities where the actors were aware only of difference? Consider, for example, the eighteenth-century use of the term Yoruba. As Robin Law has pointed out, originally the name designated only the Oyo, being the term by which the Hausa of northern Nigeria referred to the Oyo kingdom. Before the nineteenth century, he continues, 'the name Yoruba was not used to designate the larger group of which the Oyo form part ... It must, indeed, be doubtful whether the various "Yoruba" groups were conscious of forming, on linguistic or other grounds, any sort of unity or community.' Similarly, David Northrup, writing of pre-colonial South-Eastern Nigeria, observes that 'the largest unit of identity for most inhabitants does not appear to have been the primary ethnic unit such as Igbo or Ibibio, but rather the smaller dialect or cultural group'. Indeed, Igbo-speakers enslaved in the early nineteenth century had apparently never heard the name Igbo in their homelands. Or consider the farmers of the central highlands of West-Central Africa, many of whom were shipped to Brazil; they became known as the Ovimbundu because they shared similar linguistic traits, but, notes Miller, 'none of them in the eighteenth century would have claimed much unity'. Ethnicity, in so far as it existed, was clearly very localized in precolonial Africa.[25]

In fact, a distinct danger exists in applying terms such as ethnic group and nation indiscriminately in African and African-American studies. Thornton adopts rather uncritically early modern European usages by talking of 'countries' or 'nations' and even of 'national loyalty', which are not just imposed taxonomies but anachronistic ones. As Karen Fog Olwig notes of Danish West Indian slaves, they 'did not seem to identify strongly with nations, so when asked the name of his nation, a slave often responded "with the name of the place where he lived in Guinea"'. Similarly, while ethnicity can be used to stand for some kind of group (*ethnos*), it is often a residual term applied when too little is known about some group to be able to label it more precisely. The ethnic lexicon of New World planters and slave traders – and they must be distinguished – is often mysterious. As David Geggus has pointed out in the Francophone context, the labels 'Mine' and 'Caramenty' obviously derived from the ports of Elmina and Kormantin 'situated close together on the Gold Coast, but the sex ratios and morbidity levels of these two sets of slaves suggest that they were drawn from quite different, perhaps distinct' locales. Many ethnic labels were affixed inaccurately. Primarily on the basis of scattered references to large numbers of Bambara in early Louisiana, Gwendolyn Hall argues that they served as a charter group, but, as Philip Curtin had earlier noted, Bambara was a catch-all term. Some early Louisiana slaves doubtless were Bambara, an ethnic group, generally non-Muslim, who comprised the dominant people of the new kingdoms of Segu and Kaarta in the eighteenth century.

But the word also meant, in Senegambian French, any slave soldier serving in Senegal, and it could be taken as a very general designation for all Malinke-speaking peoples, or even of all people from east of the Senegal and Gambia rivers. Curtin authoritatively declares that, 'The "Bambara" slaves shipped west as a result of eighteenth-century warfare or political consolidation could be dissident people who were ethnically Bambara, or they could just as well be non-Bambara victims of Bambara raiders.' The term was more geographical than cultural.[26]

In the New World, so-called African ethnic or national identities were often convenient reconstitutions or inventions. Nor could these identities easily remain pristine in the pluralistic Americas. Analysis of the national origins and mating patterns of the Trinidadian slave population in the early nineteenth century – one of the most African slave populations at that time – reveals that the population of about 14,000 was drawn from an wide range of territories, extending from Senegambia to Mozambique. Early nineteenth-century Trinidad was also unusually urban and had relatively small slave-holdings. In this newly settled society, most African slaves – and thus about half of all slaves – did not live in families. The fortunate Africans who found partners generally found other Africans, but not often from their own ethnic group or even region. Ethnic identity, Barry Higman concluded, dissolved rapidly as a result of extensive inter-ethnic marriage.[27]

Just as ethnic identities both within Africa and the Americas should be viewed as fluid and permeable, so cultural development in the New World involved borrowing and adaptation, modification and invention. Slaves functioned as *bricoleurs*, to borrow Claude Lévi-Strauss's term, picking and choosing from a variety of cultural strains to create something new. This plasticity was evident in all aspects of slave culture – from the way the slaves wore their clothes, the way they combed their hair, to the way they organized their yards.[28]

The complexity of ethnic cultural development among New World slaves is well captured in a transcription of three African songs – ostensibly from 'Angola', 'Papa' and 'Koromanti' respectively – heard in Jamaica in 1688. In the 1680s Africans from West-Central Africa (including Angola) and the Bight of Benin (where Popo referred to a people as well as to two ports) comprised about three-quarters of all incoming slaves to Jamaica, so it is not surprising that white visitors heard a Papa and an Angolan song. A little more surprising is the Koromanti song, because only 7 per cent of known Africans imported in the 1680s were from the Gold Coast (where the port of Kormantine was located). Koromantis are often associated with early Jamaican slavery, but in the 1660s there were no Africans imported from the Gold Coast and in the 1690s less than one in ten arrivals were from that region. The only decade in the second half of the seventeenth century

when the Gold Coast was a major supplier to Jamaica was the 1670s: it contributed a quarter of Jamaica's Africans, but was easily dwarfed by the 60 per cent who came from the Bights of Benin and Biafra. Nevertheless, so-called Koromantis apparently led two Jamaican slave rebellions in 1673 and 1686, which seems to indicate they exercised a power out of all proportion to their numbers.

A musical analysis of the three songs reveals that they were far from ethnically distinctive. Rather, even at this early date in Jamaica's history when Africans were numerous and might be thought to retain a measure of ethnic integrity, the songs showed influences from other African regions. In particular, the 'Angola' song incorporated musical elements from the Akan peoples of the Gold Coast, even though retaining many Bantu features. Again, then, there seems evidence that Gold Coast peoples had undue influence. But the 'Koromanti' song had little Western Kwa (or Gold Coast) features but was rather 'a loosely bundled set of associations centered on West Africa'. In other words, perhaps the Koromanti, clearly a minority among late seventeenth-century Jamaica's slaves, were especially influential because of their adaptability, their pan-West African outlook. At any rate, as early as the late seventeenth century, syncretism and 'a process of interchange and experimentation' had clearly occurred among African musical cultures in Jamaica.[29]

Another conundrum concerning the syncretism of African traditions and the relative contributions of various African peoples is evident in the early formation of Haitian *vodun* or voodoo. The Dahomean or Aja-Fon influence in Haitian voodoo is paramount: it contributed the major deities, ceremonies, and most of the African vocabulary to this New World religion. But from extant records, which begin in about the 1720s, the Aja-Fon seem to have been a minority of Africans in St. Domingue, comprising at most about a fifth of the island's black immigrants. Like the Koramanti in Jamaica, what has to be explained is the undue influence of the Aja-Fon minority in St. Domingue. One possible explanation is that perhaps before 1720 the Aja-Fon were not a minority. Perhaps in the earliest years of St. Domingue's history they were numerous, and constituted a charter group, creating many of the cultural norms for later newcomers. Or perhaps Aja-Fon languages were particularly easy to learn or their pantheon of gods were especially structured, which gave them influence disproportionate to their numbers throughout the eighteenth century.

While the Dahomean influence in voodoo was dominant, other African sources were important. Perhaps most notable were the Kongo strains in voodoo, which is not surprising for at the height of St. Domingue's power Congos formed the largest single ethnic group in the colony's slave population. John Jenzen has noted the presence in Haitian voodoo of

various Kongo rituals, associated with *Lemba*, a cult of healing, trade, and marriage relations in seventeenth-century West-Central Africa. Luc de Huesch sees a syncretism of Dahomey's *rada* and Kongo's *petro* divinities in *vodun*. David Geggus has highlighted two religious chants dating from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which were Kongo in origin and which were sung during an initiation ceremony into a snake cult. Quite why the Kongo influence was secondary and not primary may be explained variously: the low status of Congo slaves based perhaps on their size, the ability of Congos to assimilate, the Congos' relative lack of women which may have hampered cultural transmission, and their prevalence in the mountains rather than on the plains. Secondary or not, what is most notable here, as in Jamaican music, is the apparent joining together of different African cultures in an early New World cultural form.[30]

An 'Igboized' slave culture, Douglas Chambers argues, arose in eighteenth-century Virginia. He bases his argument on the large number of slaves drawn from the Bight of Biafra who entered the Chesapeake Bay in the 1720s and 1730s. These 'first comers', he contends, shaped the material culture of the region: the cultivation of okra, itself an Igbo word; the reliance on sweet potatoes, which were the nearest equivalent to yams, the staple of the Bight of Biafra region; the prevalence of root cellars in Chesapeake quarters, where the slaves stored their sweet potatoes and other goods. Similarly, the Igbo connection is said to explain much of the musical, magical, and ceremonial culture of Virginia slaves: the incorporation of Igbo instruments such as the *gamby* (Eboe drum) and the *balafo* (xylophone); the practice of conjuring and root-doctoring, which allegedly had precise Igboland analogues; and *jonkonu*, a masquerade involving cow-horn and other animal masks, which can be likened to spirit cults and secret societies in the Bight of Biafra region.[31]

Although the Bight of Biafra region was an important source of slaves for the Chesapeake region, it seems rather far-fetched to claim that Virginia slave culture was predominantly Igbo. First, Africans from Upper Guinea constituted 44 per cent of arrivals in the Chesapeake between 1662 and 1713, outstripping those from the Bight of Biafra. Although the Bight of Biafra was a considerable supplier in these early years – providing just over a third of the Chesapeake's slaves – the numerically predominant 'first comers' came from Senegambia and Sierra Leone. The Gold Coast was a significant supplier too, particularly in the first decade of eighteenth century. The Bight of Biafra was the dominant provenance zone in the 1720s and 1730s, but this influx represented a second, not the first, wave. Other influxes, from the 1740s to 1760s, were quite heterogeneous, with Senegambia the dominant zone in the 1740s and Angola in the 1760s. Second, many of the so-called 'Igboisms' in Chesapeake slave life could

just as easily be explained as general West and Central African traits; and, as already noted, Igbo identity is itself problematic. Rather than posit a single ethnic influence, syncretism is the real story of Virginia slave culture. Finally, the reason for the notably syncretic character of Chesapeake black life must be sought not just in the scale and timing of the immigration and the enforced mingling of heterogeneous Africans, but in the local context. Africans in Virginia found themselves purchased in tiny lots, dispersed onto widely scattered estates, resident on small plantations, soon surrounded by a majority of native-born slaves, and brought into close contact with whites. All of this was not conducive to the reconstitution of an African ethnic identity.[32]

The foundation of Louisiana's Afro-Creole culture, Gwendolyn Hall claims, rests on the numerical predominance of Senegambia slaves imported to the colony in the early decades of the eighteenth century. Bambaras, she maintains, 'played a preponderant role' in the formation of the colony's slave culture. They 'constituted a language community', mounted rebellions, were accused of a disproportionate number of crimes, and influenced other slaves with their magical beliefs, evident in the widespread resort to *zinzin*, an amulet, or *grisgris*, a harmful charm, both Mande terms. Aside from whether Bambaras were a true ethnic group, the alleged paramount influence of Mande on Louisiana culture needs to be questioned. First, in the early 1720s, as Peter Caron has emphasized, Africans from the Bight of Benin dominated the colony's African population. The contribution of enslaved Aja peoples from the Slave Coast, Caron observes, may have been especially significant given the large numbers of children born to Africans between 1721 and 1726. Further, Caron demonstrates that most slaves from Senegambia came from the coastal areas, not the Niger bend, which is the area of Bambara and Mande influence. In addition, even by the middle of the eighteenth century most Louisiana slaves lived on units of ten or fewer Africans, which inhibited the domination of one ethnic group. For all these reasons and others, such as the much more heterogeneous and larger influx of Africans when Louisiana became a Spanish colony – it seems sensible to emphasize the pluralistic quality of Afro-Creole culture. The Congo influence in folklore and magic, the Fon role in voodoo, the Yoruba origins of shotgun houses, and the many African religious traditions (from Islam to Congo-Christianity to non-universal variants) that infused Louisiana religion must all be recognized.[33]

Cuban Santeria can serve as one last example of a New World neo-African cultural form. Eltis and Richardson, it will be recalled, argued that the heterogeneity of the island's Africans, the lack of women and abundance of children, and the short period of African importation should

have undermined the ability of Cuban slaves to maintain regional African cultures. Cuban Santeria seems an unlikely model for such an argument, because one of its major components was a traditional African religion, the orisha worship as practised by the Yoruba. Eltis and Richardson demonstrate that a quarter of Cuba's Africans came from the Bight of Benin, making it the second most important provenance zone for Cuba's Africans (behind West-Central Africa, which supplied about 28 per cent of the island's Africans). Furthermore, at certain times, the Bight of Benin was a dominant supplier; indeed, from 1851 to 1866, Cuba was the only market available for Bight of Benin slaves. Thus, a powerful Yoruba influence in Cuba should not be all that surprising, although perhaps the question should again be, as in the Haitian case, why West-Central African influences were not more dominant than they were.

But a number of other facilitating forces were also at work, which will demonstrate that the process of New World slave cultural development was far from straight-forward. First, there is the issue of ethno-genesis. As already noted, in eighteenth-century Africa there was no overall term for all the heterogeneous Yoruba subgroups, but in Cuba, descendants of Yoruba-speakers and some of their neighbours became *Lucumi*. 'Just as Apulians, Sicilians, and Calabians all became Italians in the United States,' George Brandon analogizes, 'Oyos, Egbas, Ijebus, and Ijeshas all became Lucumis in Cuba.' Who was primarily responsible for generating this ethnic label – the slaves, the slave traders, or most likely a combination of the two – is unclear, but this emergent ethnic identity was a New World development. Furthermore, what is evident is that while Lucumi culture had a Yoruba focus, it incorporated traits from far afield. People sold by the Yoruba became Lucumi; people of Allada and the Ibo were incorporated within the so-called Lucumi nation. Some Lucumi words and phrases are not Yoruba in origin, and seem to be Ewe or Fon in derivation. Once again, a minority exercised dominion in excess of its numbers.

In the Cuban case, an important – perhaps the most important – reason why Africans were able to retain so much of their regional cultures should be sought in towns. Cuba was a quite urbanized society by New World standards, and urban slaves experienced a less regimented existence than their rural counterparts. They had greater latitude for cultural development. Slaves and freed people created Afro-Cuban *cabildos* or lodges, clubs, fraternities, and dance groups. They drank in taverns with their *carabelas* or shipmates. By the end of the eighteenth century, twenty-one *cabildos* existed in Havana alone. Each had its own ritual centre, its African language, its distinctive drums and drumming styles and its dances. Just as with Jamaican music, an exchange of musical and other cultural styles no doubt occurred across *cabildo* and ethnic lines. These clubs were, in

Brandon's words, 'important centers for the preservation of African religion in Cuba's cities'. One or more Lucumi *cabildos* provided the crucible in which Santeria evolved.[34]

The role of towns in facilitating ethnic identity in the New World points to the importance of context in the formation of slave culture in the Americas. Perhaps neo-African cultural forms in the New World appeared most readily in urban settings, as the example of Cuban Santeria (and Bahian Candomble) suggests. Conversely, the most generic African cultural forms may have been most conspicuous in heavily rural places, such as Virginia. Yet, important as the urban/rural contrast was in moulding ethnic affiliations in the New World, it was far from being the only contextual variable in shaping black cultures in the Americas. The scale of immigration from a particular African coastal region or regions was fundamental to the process of New World ethno-genesis. Equally important was timing: first-comers in some situations, as in the rapid formation of a new language and religion in Surinam, were extremely influential; in other settings, late-comers, as in the Yoruba influx to Cuba, played a vital role. The demographic structure of the immigrant influx – the ratio of men to women, adults to children – was an important key to cultural transmission. Whether planters bought Africans singly or in large groups was another crucial factor in shaping slave life. The size of plantations, the proportion of black to white, and the nature of the economy were yet other features of a New World context that determined the character of a slave culture.[35]

Finally, even after making allowances for all the demographic, economic and social variables that fostered or inhibited ethnic identity among slaves, many unpredictabilities remain. In some cases, particular African minorities were influential in shaping certain slave societies, perhaps because these African minorities were especially adaptable and could incorporate others, or perhaps because some features of their homeland culture were especially attractive to others, or perhaps because of their high status among Europeans. Such might explain the influence of 'Koromantis' in Jamaica. Conversely, in other cases, particular African majorities were surprisingly uninfluential, perhaps because they were too adaptable and were therefore readily assimilated by others, or perhaps because they lacked enough women to transmit effectively their culture, or perhaps because they were located on the margins rather than in the heartlands of their new society, or perhaps because they were viewed negatively by Europeans. Such might explain the relative lack of influence of 'Congos' in St. Domingue.

Overall, Africans in the Americas had to adapt to survive. They had no time for debates about cultural purity or precise roots; they had no necessary continuing commitment to the societies from which they came. They were denied much of their previous social and cultural heritages: the personnel

who maintained their homeland institutions, the complex social structures of their ancestral societies, their kings and courts, their guilds and cult-groups, their markets and armies. Even what they brought they ruthlessly jettisoned because it was no longer applicable or relevant to their new situations. No wonder, as Mintz puts it, when we think of the history of African-American slaves, 'we are speaking of mangled pasts'. For that reason, he continues, 'It is not the precise historical origins of a word, a phrase, a musical instrument or a rhythm that matters, so much as the creative genius of the users, molding older cultural substances into new and unfamiliar patterns, without regard to purity or pedigree'.[36]

Whether the focus is on African regional origins, American destinations, or New World cultural developments, the emphasis should be on heterogeneity, on fluid boundaries, on precarious and permeable zones of interaction, on hybrid societies, on mosaics of borderlands where cultures jostled and converged in combinations and permutations of dizzying complexity. A key way in which the many and disparate parts of the Atlantic world were coming together – albeit at unequal speeds – was in the creation of ever more mixed, heterogeneous cultures. The homogenizing tendency of stressing cultural unity in Africa, of emphasizing the non-random character of the slave trade, and of seeing the dominance of particular African coastal regions or ethnicities in most American settings, is at variance with the central forces shaping the early modern Atlantic world. This tendency should be resisted.

NOTES

1. Bernard Bailyn, 'The Idea of Atlantic History', *Itinerario*, 20, no.1 (1996), pp.19–44; Daniel W. Howe, 'American History in an Atlantic Context: An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 3 June 1993' (Oxford, 1993).
2. David Eltis, 'Free and Coerced Transatlantic Migrations: Some Comparisons', *American Historical Review*, 88 (1983), pp.251–80.
3. Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1969), p.xvi.
4. John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1680* (New York, 1992), pp.1, 195–7.
5. Michael L. Conniff and Thomas J. Davis (eds.), with various contributing authors, *Africans in the Americas: A History of the Black Diaspora* (New York, 1994), pp.53–8; Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, *Africans in Colonial Louisiana: the Development of Afro-Creole Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1992), p.159; Mervyn C. Alleyne, *Roots of Jamaican Culture* (London, 1988), pp. x, 18; Michael Mullin, *Africa in America: Slave Acculturation and Resistance in the American South and the British Caribbean, 1736–1831* (Urbana, Illinois, 1992), p.160.
6. In addition to the three principal organizers are three associates: Herbert S. Klein, Joseph C. Miller, and Barbara L. Solow. The core data consist of 177 fields of information, including the names of vessels, captains and shipowners, regions and dates of trade in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, and the number, age, and gender of slaves confined on the middle passage. The directors eventually hope to link related information, such as African climatic patterns, slave phenotypes, slave rebellions, and slave prices to the main data-set.

7. David Eltis and David Richardson, 'The Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1595–1867' (unpublished paper presented to the Social Science History Meeting, 1995). This is an important paper. Much of my analysis, which sometimes varies from that of the authors, is based on their tables. I owe them a great debt for sharing their information with me.
8. David Eltis, 'The Volume and African Origins of the British Slave Trade before 1714', *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines*, 138 (1995), pp.617–27; David Richardson, 'Slave Exports from West and West-Central Africa, 1700–1810: New Estimates of Volume and Distribution', *Journal of African History*, 30 (1989), pp.1–22; David Richardson, 'The British Empire and the Atlantic Slave Trade 1660–1807', in Peter J. Marshall (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Eighteenth Century* (forthcoming), Table 3.
9. David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman, 'Was the Slave Trade Dominated by Men?', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 23 (1992), pp.237–57 (quote p.245); David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman, 'Fluctuations in Sex and Age Ratios in the Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1663–1864', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 46 (1993), pp.308–23. For a less persuasive view on this subject, see Joseph E. Inikori, 'Export versus Domestic Demand: The Determinants of Sex Ratios in the Transatlantic Slave Trade', *Research in Economic History*, 14 (1992), pp.117–66.
10. Eltis and Richardson, 'The Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade'.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.; Richardson, 'Slave Exports', pp.13–14; Johannes Menne Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade 1600–1815* (New York, 1990), pp.114–15, 122–3.
13. Robin Law, *The Oyo Empire c. 1600–c. 1836: A West African Imperialism in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Oxford, 1977), pp.206, 219–29, 274, 281–2, 303–8; Paul E. Lovejoy, 'The Central Sudan and the Atlantic Slave Trade', in Robert W. Harms, Joseph C. Miller, David S. Newbury, and Michele D. Wagner (eds.), *Paths Toward the Past: African Historical Essays in Honor of Jan Vansina* (Atlanta, 1994), pp.345–70 (quote p.359).
14. Joseph C. Miller, 'The Numbers, Origins, and Destinations of Slaves in the Eighteenth Century Angolan Slave Trade', in Joseph E. Inikori and Stanley L. Engerman (eds.), *The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe* (Durham, North Carolina, 1992), pp.77–115; David Northrup, *Trade without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria* (Oxford, 1978), pp.60–4.
15. Eltis and Richardson, 'The Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade'.
16. Mary C. Karasch, *Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro 1808–1850* (Princeton, 1987), pp.xxiv, 8, 18.
17. Eltis and Richardson, 'The Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade'; David Eltis and David Richardson, 'West Africa and the Transatlantic Slave Trade: New Evidence of Long-Run Trends', this volume.
18. Adam Jones and Marion Johnson, 'Slaves from the Windward Coast', *Journal of African History*, 21 (1980), pp.17–34, for arguments for not accepting destinations; Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, pp.120–4; Karasch, *Slave Life in Rio*, p.16. When detailed records on individual voyages are available, the ship often stops at a number of ports: see, for example, Nigel Tattersfield, *The Forgotten Trade, Comprising the Log of the Daniel and Henry of 1700 and Accounts of the Slave Trade from the Minor Ports of England 1698–1725* (London, 1991), and Suzanne Schwarz, *Slave Captain: The Career of James Irving in the Liverpool Atlantic Slave Trade* (Wrexham, Clwyd, 1995).
19. Personal communication from David Eltis, 23 October 1996.
20. Joseph C. Miller, *Way of Death* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1988), pp.7–8, 141–53, 189–203, 223, 224 (quote), 226.
21. Eltis and Richardson, 'The Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade'.
22. Richardson, 'The British Empire and the Atlantic Slave Trade', in Marshall (ed.), *Oxford History of the British Empire*; David Eltis, 'The Traffic in Slaves between the British West Indian Colonies, 1807–1833', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 25 (1972), pp.55–64; Svend E. Green-Pedersen, 'The Scope and Structure of the Danish Negro Slave Trade', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, 19 (1971), pp.149–97; Postma, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade*, pp.168–9, 226; Franklin W. Knight, *Slave Society in Cuba during the*

Nineteenth Century (Madison, Wisconsin, 1970), p.8.

23. Miller, 'Number, Origins', in Inikori and Engerman (eds.), *Atlantic Slave Trade*, p.89; Patrick Manning, 'Migrations of Africans to the Americas: The Impact on Africans, Africa, and the New World', *The History Teacher*, 26 (1993), pp.279–96, especially p.281; Philip D. Morgan and Michael L. Nicholls, 'Slaves in Piedmont Virginia, 1720–1790', *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, 46 (1989), pp.211–51; Philip D. Morgan, 'Black Society in the Lowcountry, 1760–1810', in Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman (eds.), *Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the American Revolution* (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1983), pp.83–141.
24. Miller, *Way of Death*, p.225; Philip D. Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1975), pp.187–8. See also Adam Jones, 'Receptive Nations: Evidence Concerning the Demographic Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century', *Slavery and Abolition*, 11 (1990), pp.42–57.
25. Richard Rathbone, Review of Thornton, *Africa and Africans* in *Journal of African History*, 34 (1993), 495–6; Law, *Oyo Empire*, pp.5–7; Northrup, *Trade Without Rulers*, p.15; Miller, *Way of Death*, p.28. This subject is treated at much greater length in Sean Hawkins and Philip Morgan, 'Patterns of Cultural Transmission: Diffusion, Destruction, and Development in the African Diaspora' (paper delivered at York University Workshop, 'The African Diaspora and the Nigerian Hinterland', 2–4 February 1996, which the authors hope to publish in a revised form soon).
26. Karen Fog Olwig, 'African Cultural Principles in Caribbean Slave Societies: A View from the Danish West Indies', in Stephan Palmie (ed.), *Slave Cultures and the Cultures of Slavery* (Knoxville, Tennessee, 1995), p.29; Sidney W. Mintz, 'More on the Peculiar Institution', *New West Indian Guide*, 58 (1984), pp.185–99, especially p.189; David Geggus, 'Sex Ratio, Age and Ethnicity in the Atlantic Slave Trade: Data from French Shipping and Plantation Records', *Journal of African History*, 30 (1989), pp.23–44, especially p.35; Curtin, *Atlantic Slave Trade*, p.184, and Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa*, p.179 (quote).
27. Barry W. Higman, 'African and Creole Slave Family Patterns in Trinidad', *Journal of Family History*, 3 (1978), pp.163–80. For a contrasting argument in a different context, see Colin A. Palmer, 'From Africa to the Americas: Ethnicity in the Early Black Communities of the Americas', *Journal of World History*, 6 (1995), pp.223–36.
28. Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (London, 1966); Shane White and Graham White, 'Slave Hair and African-American Culture in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', *Journal of Southern History*, 61 (1995), pp.45–76, and 'Slave Clothing and African-American Culture in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', *Past and Present*, 148 (August 1995), pp.149–86; Grey Gundaker, 'Tradition and Innovation in African-American Yards', *African Arts* (April 1993), pp.58–71, 94–96; Richard Westmacott, *African-American Gardens and Yards in the Rural South* (Knoxville, 1992).
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30. Serge Larose, 'The Meaning of Africa in Haitian Vodu', in Ioan M. Lewis (ed.), *Symbols and Sentiments* (London, 1977), pp.85–116; John M. Janzen, *Lemba, 1650–1930: A Drum of Affliction in Africa and the New World* (New York, 1982), especially pp.273–92; Luc de Heusch, 'Kongo in Haiti: A New Approach to Religious Syncretism', *Man*, XXIV (1989), pp.290–303; David Geggus, 'Haitian Voodoo in the Eighteenth Century: Language, Culture, Resistance', *Jahrbuch Fur Geschichte Von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Latein Amerikas*, 28 (1991), pp.21–51; David Geggus, 'The Bois Caiman Ceremony', *Journal of Caribbean History*, 25 (1991), pp.41–57, especially p.50; David Geggus, 'Sugar and Coffee Cultivation in Saint Domingue and the Shaping of the Slave Labor Force', in Ira Berlin and Philip D. Morgan (eds.), *Cultivation and Culture: Labor and the Shaping of Slave Life in the Americas* (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1993), pp.73–98, especially p.80. See also John K. Thornton, 'On the Trail of Voodoo: African Christianity in Africa and the Americas', *The Americas*, 44 (1987–1988), pp.261–78.

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